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This  paper  explores  Scitovsky’s  contribution  to  behavioral  economics  and 
examines in particular the changes his theory based on the findings of human brain 
psychophysiologists  has  brought  to  choice  theory.  The  evidence  here  gathered 
points  out  how  Scitovsky  was  making  his  suggestions  for  an  alternative  to  the 
rationalist-based theory of choice model as far back in the early 1970s. The same 
evidence  singles  out  Scitovsky  as  one  of  the  most  influential  forerunners  of  a 
successful  program  of  psychologically-based  economic  research  which  has  only 
recently been acknowledged as a promising field for further investigation. 
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Economic literature widely recognises that the first neoclassical economists were also part  
psychologists (Bruni and Sugden 2007). Political economists had previously shown they 
were not able to use scientific methodology on the theory of work value, in spite of all the 
late  nineteenth  century  positivist  pressure  exerted  in  the  various  domains  of  science. 
However, some particularly eclectic economists like William S. Jevons (1871) and Francis 
Y. Edgeworth (1881) stood out in the way they were beginning to look with interest at the 
theories  and  instruments  of  psychophysics,  given  that  this  type  of  psychological 
theorization answered both the positivist need for scientific rigour and the economic one 
for  utility  measurement.  Psychophysics  indentified  scientific  laws  by  turning  to  John 
Stuart  Mill’s  concrete  deductive  method  (1862)[1843],  which  constructed  theories  by 
means of the deduction of a series of empirical regularities. Furthermore, Mill’s method 
was based on assumptions about the nature of pleasure and pain which were broadly 
compatible with the period’s Benthamite-derived assumptions about economics.  
Jevons, in particular, found it appropriate to use Fechner’s “just noticeable change” unit of 
sensation (1964)[1860] as the method for measuring the magnitude of (dis)utility. 
Among the neoclassical economists of the second generation, Vilfredo Pareto also held 
that psychology was an indispensable resource for economics (Pareto 1971 [1909], Ch. 2, 
§1),  though  he  also  maintained  that  psychological  instruments  were  not  sufficiently 
precise, and therefore scientific enough for a discipline which boasted of being scientific 
(ivi, Ch. 4, §33). Despite being a steadfast believer in the excellence of Mill’s concrete 
deductive method, he thought that the rules of economics had to be based on the firmly-
established  empirical  propositions of mechanical  physics  rather  than introspections of 
“any metaphysical entity” (ivi, Ch. 3, §36b). Pareto himself had already previously affirmed 
that  measuring  utility  was  not  necessary  for  the  ends  of  economic  calculations: 
«reconnaitre qu’une quantité existe et la mesurer sont deux problèmes différents» (Pareto 
1966 [1898], p. 106). He felt it was enough to know if the pleasure deriving from some 
specific  goods  was  more  or  less  than  the  pleasure  deriving  from  others  (ordinal 
measurement of utility). This expedient allowed the utility of goods to be perceived no 
longer on the basis of interior sensations which could not be measured accurately, but on 
preferences    observable  in  consumer  choices.  This  allowed  Pareto  to  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  at  “once  the  individual  has  revealed  his/her  preferences,  he  can 
disappear”2, in that he has already furnished all that is necessary for understanding how 
he will behave (the famous Paretian turn).  
                                                        
2 Pareto (1906), Ch. 3, §57. 3 
 
The premises for elaborating a theory of choice based on a rational-choice model had been 
put into place. The economists of the next generation, however, realized they were faced 
by an apparently undefeatable obstacle: they were aware that sensations could precede 
behavior, but they also knew that sensations could only be ascertained by behavior.  
In 1938, in artificially equalizing unrevealed preferences to revealed ones, Paul Samuelson 
in his “A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer’s Behavior” completed the sea-change 
initiated  by  Pareto.  Assuming  that  people  behave  in  a  fully  rational  way,  economists 
started  to  validate  a  criterion  of  formal  rationality  which  allowed  them  to  avoid  the 
phenomenon of the intransitivity of preferences by making the theory checkable by means 
of the process of falsification (once people have shown they prefer A to B, they therefore 
should not choose B). 
Thus,  after  the  shift  initiated  by  Pareto’s  reformulation  completed  by  Samuelson’s 
axiomatization,  neoclassical  economics  eliminated  for  good  the  psychological  concepts 
widely used by the first neoclassicals (Bruni and Sugden 2007). Either not being able or 
not desiring to delve into the intricate logic of human motivation, traditional economists 
then  chose  to  circumscribe  their  sphere  of  enquiry  to  revealed  preferences,  making 
axioms and limiting themselves to registering as “anomalies” any individual behavior that 
did not fit in  with  rationality-based models. 
The last, ground-breaking event took place when George J. Stigler and Gary Becker (1977) 
extended the economic approach of rational individual choice and applied it to generality 
of the human behavior.  
Scitovsky’s criticism of the neoclassical model of the theory of choice belongs precisely to 
this context. He argues that rational-choice modelling allows the formulation of a most 
elegant theory of choice, which proves however useless as a model for the behavior of 
homo œconomicus, because “[as neoclassical economists] improved their models, making 
them more rigorous, more quantitative, and more elegant, they gradually simplified and 
whittled down these psychological underpinnings to almost vanishing point» (Scitovsky 
1986 [1985], p. 166). To Scitovsky this approach is to be contrasted  with what he takes to 
be  the  “scientific  approach”:3  “to  observe  behaviour―different  people’s  behaviour  in 
similar situations and the same person’s behaviour in different situations―in order to find, 
contained  in  those  observations,  the  regularities,  the  common  elements,  the  seeming 
contradictions and the resolution of those contradictions which then become foundations 
of a theory to explain behaviour” (Scitovsky 1992a, p. vii-viii). 
 
                                                        
3 «I consider that approach [to regard preferences as revealed by consumer behavior] unscientific, 
and I am trying in this book [The Joyless Economy] to lay the ground for something both humbler 
and better» (Scitovsky 1992a, p. xiii). 4 
 
1.  “Psychologizing by Economists”4 
Scitovsky’s solution is to suggest going back to psychology for the same reason for which 
more than a century earlier Jevons had turned to psychophysics, i.e. to elaborate a choice 
theory which could be deemed more “scientific”. In particular he finds fruitful the theories 
of behavioral psychologists: 
 
«[I]  use  behavioral  psychology  to  fill  in  gaps  in  the  economist’s  understanding  of 
consumer  behavior  ...  to  analyze  the  pressures  that  influence  his  behavior  and  the 
direction in which they push him» (Scitovsky 1973, pp. 225-6). 
 
The  principal  mistake  he  feels  all  neoclassical  economists  had  made  in  trying  to  fit 
psychological  findings  into  economic  theory  was  to  collocate  their  theories  in  the 
framework of behaviorism.5 In order to have a fuller understanding of the reasons for his 
critique, it is necessary to explore some of the main concepts of behaviorism.  
As Scitovsky  finely argues, the mainstay of behaviorist psychology, the principle of drive 
weds perfectly the perspective of neoclassical economists, who hold that the greater the 
utility,  the  greater  the  pleasure  it  produces  or  discomfort  it  removes  (the  hedonic 
principle of utility). 
Sometimes defined by scientific literature as “a behavior tendency towards an incentive 
(Warden, 1931), or a “power that pushed an organism into action” (Woodworth, 1938) or 
“motivating state” (Miller and Dollard, 1941), up to  the point of being assimilated tout 
court into the more general notion of “motivation” (Hull, 1943), the principle of drive is 
collocated  at  the  basis  of  a  deductive-axiomatic  theory  of  behavior,  founded  on  the 
postulates  linked  to  mechanistic  concept  of  behavior  associated  with  the  “stimulus-
response”  scheme  (Novarese  and  Rizzello,  2004).  Behaviorist  psychology,  in  fact, 
considers biological necessities (hunger, thirst, cold) on the level of drives, which press the 
organism  into  behaving  in  order  to  eliminate  the  need  and  restore  a  state  of  inner 
equilibrium which is presumed to be static (homeostasis). The psychological theory of the 
drive, therefore, postulates human behavior just like that of an animal, nothing more than 
the outer result – therefore revealed - of an inner activation of the organism aroused 
essentially  by  the  necessity  to  eliminate  discomfort.  The  psychologists  going  into  the 
                                                        
4 The title and contents of the present paragraph refer to the ideas in the article that Scitovsky 
wrote in 1985, entitled “Psychologizing by Economists”, later (1986) published in Alan J. e Heather 
W. MacFadyen (eds), Economic Psychology: Intersections in Theory and Application (pp. 165-80). 
North-Holland: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.  
5 For a convincing argument on the key points binding psychophysics to behaviorism, see Baars 
(1986).  5 
 
theory of drive, came to the conclusion that the individual reacts to stimuli coming from 
the outer environment with given and predetermined responses (Watson, 1913).6 
As Jevons had already noted independently, “this power of anticipation must have a large 
influence  in  Economics”  (1871,  p.  40).  The  pleasant  sensation  that  arises  from  the 
restoration of inner equilibrium (homeostasis) can be said to correspond to what is also 
called  “satisfaction”  in  economics.  Scitovsky  too  recognizes  that  the  behaviorist 
psychology theory of the drive, collocated in the Stimulus-Response framework and based 
on  the reduction  of  discomfort, is  very  useful  for  working  out  economic  previsions of 
production  and  consumption.  Nevertheless  he  also  stresses  that  the  reduction  of 
discomfort (i.e. the satiation principle) “is only half of the story” (Scitovsky 1974, p. 10), in 
that behaviorism does not contemplate the equally probable opposite case, in which the 
organism feels the need to increase too bland a stimulus, as happens in cases of fighting off 
boredom (par. 3):7 
 
«[...] and unfortunately, it is this lopsided psychological theory that seems to have been at 
the origin of the economist’s theorizing. For the notion that specific needs raise arousal 
level and that this motivates people to satisfy such needs and so lower arousal fits in very 
well with the economist’s utility function» (ibidem; my italics). 
 
After the pioneer work carried out by Hebb (1955), Heron (1957) and Berlyne (1960, 
1963) psychologists were quick to abandon a behaviorist vision. Economists, however, 
have gone on considering exclusively the needs that lead to a reduction of the stimulus in 
that such a theory fits in well with their decreasing marginal utility theory, completely 
ignoring the issue of pleasantly stimulating sensations.  According to Scitovsky instead, the 
study of which needs increase the levels of the stimulus and the biological mechanism 
regulating  it  (the  arousal  mechanism),  is  a  question  of  considerable  importance.  As 
motivational psychologists have in fact shown, the consumption of goods procuring an 
increase in the level of arousal procures a satisfaction equal, if not higher, than what is felt 
consuming goods leading to a reduction. For Scitovsky, neglecting this important source of 
satisfaction has been the major mistake committed by economists.  
                                                        
6 James Watson, the psychologist who founded behaviorism, holds very clearly that its aim is to 
predict  and  control  behavior,  psychology  as  the  behaviorist  views  it  is  a  purely  objective 
experimental  branch  of  natural  science.  Its  theoretical  goal  is  the  prediction  and  control  of 
behavior» (Watson 1913, p. 158; my italics).  
7  «From  the  economist’s  point  of  view,  arousal  reduction  or  drive  reduction  is  especially 
important, because almost all of man’s economic activities, consumption as well as production, 
fall  into  this  category.  No  wonder  the  economist’s  model  of  consumer  behavior  also  come 
closest to that half of the psychologist’s theory. But very different and quite alien to economics 
and the economist’s way of thinking is the other half of the psychologist’s theory of motivation 
of behavior, which deals with the raising of too low arousal» (Scitovsky 1992a, p. 30; my italics). 
 6 
 
2.  The arousal theory 
Moruzzi  and  Magoun  (1949),  the  first  researchers  to  conduct  experiments  of  the 
stimulation of a mesocephalic structure known as the “Ascendent Reticular Activation 
System”,  defined  the  mechanism  of  arousal  as  a  “state  of  activation  characterized  by 
specific electro-cephalographic responses associated with modification in the behavior as 
in subjective experience”. 
The neuro-anatomic seat of the arousal system is localized in the area which goes from 
the  eyeball  to  the  thalamus,  called  the  “ascendent  reticular  formation”.  The  primary 
function of this nervous centre is to send to the cerebral cortex impulses which serve to 
reduce or if necessary increase the state of alertness of  the organism. When it is scarcely 
stimulated  (as  in  sleep  or  coma),  the  reticular  formation  sends  the  cerebral  cortex  a 
minimum quantity of impulses, in order to maintain the subject’s state of alertness at a 
very low level. In this state the subject is unable to respond to solicitations originating  
inside  or  outside  his/her  organism.  When  the  subject  is  in  a  situation  which  arouses 
tension or tiredness, the reticular formation is strongly stimulated, “bombarding” with 
stimulations the entire cerebral cortex (Hebb 1955, p. 250), and provoking in the case of 
excessive stimulation, sequences of inadequate behaviour.8 
Briefly, arousal could be described as “the brain’s heart”. As the heart is the main organ 
responsible for the circulation of blood, receiving  peripheral venous blood and supplying  
with arterial blood the tissues of the whole body, so the arousal is the system responsible 
for  the  collection,  selection  and  distribution  of  the  information  sent  around  by  the 
peripheral neural impulses.9 In the same way, just as the heart pumps blood as long as the 
organism is alive, so the arousal system is in constant activity (even during sleep cerebral 
activity is very intense, often a sign of dreaming). Still today motivational psychology sets 
up  the  functioning  of  the  arousal  on  the  basis  of  the  original  theory  of  the  aesthetic  
psychologist  Daniel  Berlyne  who  saw  arousal  as  a  neurophysiological  process  whose 
intensity varies along a continuum, with the lower pole given by a state of slumber or 
coma and upper pole by a state of maximum excitement.10 The differing intensity of 
reaction to a determined outer stimulus is explained by the tone of the arousal that the 
individual  registers  in  a  given  moment  in  the  day.  A  moderate  level  of  arousal 
                                                        
8  In  The  Joyless  Economy,  Scitovsky  describes  arousal  more  succinctly  as  “level  of  excitement” 
(Scitovsky 1992a, p. 288). 
9 As Scitovsky also notes, the phenomenon of death is no longer associated in the medical field not 
with the heart  but the brain stopping activity (ivi, p. 18). 
10 Scitovsky too emphasizes that the arousal system is constantly active: «[t]he level of arousal … 
depends on the stimulation the central nervous system receives from outside, through the senses 
(exteroceptive stimulation), from the muscles and internal organs of the organism (enteroceptive 
stimulation), and from within the brain itself (cerebral stimulation); but it never sinks to zero as 
long as the organism is alive» (1992a, p. 18). 
10 Cf. Encyclopedia of Psychology (2000), entry “arousal”, with Berlyne (1963 [1962] p. 149). 7 
 
corresponds to a relaxed state, a fairly higher level corresponds to a pleasurable level of 
excitement, a very high level can indicate euphoria, as well as anger or panic. 
The motivational theory of the arousal elaborated by Berlyne (1960) and founded on 
introspections  belonging  to  the  psychophysiologist  Wilhem  Wundt  (1874)  sees  the 
organism in a state of constant activation aiming at maintaining not a homeostatic, but a 
dynamic  equilibrium. When  the  excitement  level  is  too  high,  the  arousal  system send 
impulses to the brain which are translated into actions lowering it (e.g. I eat to reduce the 
hunger stimulus; I lower the volume of the music). When the excitement level is too low, 
the arousal system sends impulses to the brain which are then translated into actions to 
increase it. Generally such actions coincide with pleasantly stimulating activities, set in 
place for recreational reasons like for example doing a hobby or sport, reading a book, 
taking  part  in  a  pleasant  conversation.  Experts  (Hebb,  1955;  Berlyne,  1962)  have 
observed that a level of moderate arousal is the most gratifying. Sensations of pain and 
pleasure intervene as “regulators” of the emotion, so that the state of excitement is kept at 
an intermediate level (Fig. 1). 
 
 












Arousal psychologists have validated the thesis that the excitement system does not work 
in only one direction, from sensations to emotions (I cry out because I have burnt myself), 
but also in the opposite sense, with the translation of emotions into sensations (I sweat 
cold  out  of  fear).  This  brought  them  to  hypothesize  a  multidimensional  activation 
system).11   
                                                        
11 Cf. Rolls (2001, pp. 4444-9). 
Key. The graph show the inverted 
“U”  relationship  that  Scitovsky 
(1992a)  identifies  between  the 
level  of  arousal  of  the  organism 
and the individual’s performance. 
With too low or too high levels of 
arousal, performance is poor. The 
best performance comes when the 
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Psychologists had for some time already shown that the reduction of a stimulus, whether 
it be pleasant (as for example with a strong emotion) or unpleasant (as in answer to a 
discomfort) leads to a sensation of comfort which, if it initially gives relief, then bores and 
with time ends by doing harm. The pioneer experiment carried out in 1957 by Heron on 
boredom (quoted in Scitovsky 1992a, p. 54) shows paradoxically that the absence of pain, 
i.e. comfort, leads to pain in the terms of boredom; the defence mechanism excogitated by 
the human organism against boredom is alienation. As, in fact Scitovsky remarks, the point 
that registers the maximum comfort according to the economic theory of pleasure-utility – 
corresponds to biological homeostasis, or the point “O”, where the individual feels neither 
pain nor pleasure (Fig. 2). 
 
« … but the opposite [to the ‘unstimulated condition’] it’s true, because the process of 
satisfying a need is pleasurable in itself» (Scitovsky 1992a, p. 64; my italics). 
 
 
The way arousal functions shows, therefore, that the organism is not inert and neither 
does  it  limit  itself  to  reacting  to  internal  or  external  drives,  as  the Stimulus-Response 
Principle, but it organizes itself to modify its surrounding environment spontaneously by 
means of autonomously determined actions.  
 
«[The] observation of animals and people ... indicates that much time and energy is 
taken up by brief, self-contained, often repetitive acts which are their own reason, ... 
autonomously  motivated,  and  not  ...  small  contributions  to  some  remote,  critically 
important aim» (Berlyne 1963[1962], pp. 4-6; in Scitovsky 1992a, p. 17; my italics). 
 
For the ends of our enquiry,  we can briefly conclude that in the first case (the elaboration 
of  sensations  into  emotions)  the  arousal  system  functions  as  a  server  (physiological 
activation) while in the second (translation of emotions into sensations) it functions as 
provider (psychological activation) in a network in a state of constant interconnection 
with the environment. 
How  the  arousal  mechanism  functions  opens  up  important  questions  of  an  economic 
nature.  According  to  Scitovsky  the  autonomous  activation  of  arousal  (psychological) 
shows that the human being is not induced to action by simple drives, but desires even when 
he/she has no needs. Economists meet autonomous activation in all those activities taking 
place only for the pleasure of doing them (autonomously motivated), like recreational 
activities.  However,  Scitovsky  finds  that  such  activities  do  not  really  comply  with 
traditional economic theory, which is based on the satisfaction of markedly physiological 9 
 
needs, the objects and products of the industrial age, like eating or making a heavy job less 
tiring.12 
On the basis of such observations, he concludes that an economy centred exclusively on 
the reduction of the arousal level, or the elimination of discomfort through the satisfaction 
of a need, does not increase but on the contrary reduces individual well-being. This is also 
held  true  of  social,  (as  will  be  later  shown  par.  4),  because  it  does  not  take  into 























3. The difference between pleasure and comfort 
Thanks to his studies on the arousal theory, Scitovsky manages to operate a clear and 
substantial distinction between pleasure and comfort which distances him conceptually 
from the hedonistic-utilitarian perspective. Though pleasure and comfort are both sources 
of satisfaction, Scitovsky sees them as having a different nature.  Once the individual  feels 
comfort in not being disturbed by any need (i.e. no pain, no hunger or cold), Scitovsky 
identifies  a  stative  position  (biological  homeostasis).  Since  pleasure  is  instead  the 
sensation felt after a change in the excitement level either due to an increase or decrease  
(stimulation or relaxation) in the level of excitement, Scitovsky identifies pleasure with 
change.  
                                                        
12 The subject in matter of The Joyless Economy is the consumer behavior of the average American 
household. Scitovsky’s critics against the American lifestyle needs to be traced back to the historic 
period in which it has been put forward, that is, in the 70ies of the past century. The critics remains 
valid once we recognize that the present day consumers are hungry for restless stimulating novelties. 
13 See, Di Giovinazzo (2008). 
comfort 
Key.  In  the  graph  pleasure  and  pain  are 
placed  at  each  end  of  a  monodimensional 
scale,  in  the  same  way  as  Edgeworth’s 
hedonimeter.  If  traditional  economists 
consider  needs  and  products  aiming  at   
arousal reduction, the effect will be to feel 
comfort, or the sensation felt when tension 
is relaxed. As shown by psychologists, that 
determines  a  homeostatic  situation  which 
initially sets off a sensation of comfort and 
with  time  produces  boredom.  The  overall 
effect will therefore be a decrease and not an 
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«Put more simply, comfort  and discomfort have to  do with the speed, pleasure  with the 
acceleration and deceleration of one’s emotion» (ivi, p. 61).   
 
Comfort/ pleasure, discomfort/ pain are not therefore synonyms and neither do they have 
the same origin. Comfort and dis-comfort have to do with the intensity of emotion, while  
pleasure and pain depend on an increase or decrease in intensity. What furnishes pleasure 
is therefore the change in the arousal level and not the level as such. This shows that 
physical pleasure and mental pain or vice-versa can be felt at the same moment.14 
Following such discoveries, in open contrast with formulation of traditional economics, 
which  still  collocate  pain  and  pleasure  on  a  monodimensional  scale  of  values  (e.g. 
Edgeworth’s  hedonimeter),  Scitovsky  concludes  that  since  pleasure  and  comfort  are 
ontologically different, they cannot be measured on a single scale of values: 
 
«in accepting that hypothesis [arousal mechanism], we must abandon the old-fashioned 
notion  that  pain  and  pleasure  are  the  negative  and  positive  segments  of  a  one-
dimensional  scale,  something  like  a  hedonic  gauge,  calibrated  from  utter  misery  to 
supreme bliss, on which a person’s hedonic state registers the higher the better off he is» 
(ivi, p. 61).  
 
As  a  further  development  of  arousal  theory,  Scitovsky  also  notes  that  an  increase  in 
excitement is a pleasant sensation at a contained level of excitement while high levels   
result in unpleasant feelings. Vice-versa a reduction in excitement results in a pleasant 
sensation (Fig. 3). An intermediate level of arousal is therefore the most gratifying.  
Replacing  satisfaction  with  utility  (Fig.  4),  it  follows  that  utility  is  greatest  when 
pleasure/comfort is at medium level. What emerges becomes very important for economic 









                                                        
14 «The existence of separate pleasure and aversion systems confirms our introspective feeling that 
pleasure is something different from and more than the absence of pain and discomfort; it also 





















4. Towards an alternative paradigm of consumer behavior 
The importance that pleasantly stimulating activities have as sources of satisfaction beyond 
those  of  comfort,  induce  Scitovsky  to  theorize  next  to  physiological  needs,  mental  and 
physical exercise (the need for stimuli) and socio-psychological needs (social desires) like 
the desire to live together (sociality) and undertake interpersonal relationships.15 Scitovsky 
calls these products addressing satisfying physiological needs “defensive goods” (the most 
widespread is the electric household appliance) in that in that they function essentially to 
remove discomfort. He calls creative goods those satisfying the need for creativity, including 
relational  activities (Fig. 5).16 
On the basis of his research, Scitovsky notes that though appetitive desires, social desires 
and the need for stimuli are needs with different ontological natures, they are all primary 
and innate in human beings («all of them are urgent and essential needs but different one 
from  another»;  Scitovsky  1992b,  p.  254).  Furthermore,  since  comfort  is  stative,  while 
pleasure depends on change, he observes that the two sources of satisfaction are not simply 
ontologically  different,  but  mutually  exclusive  “the  continuous  maintenance  of  comfort 
would eliminate pleasure because with arousal continuously at its optimum level, there 
                                                        
15 Scitovsky (1992a, p. 79; see also, 1986 [1985], p. 168). 
16  For  a  formalized  representation  of  the  distinction  between  the  types  of  activities  within  the 
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Key. The diagram is a graphic representation 
of Scitovsky’s conceptual distinction between 
comfort  and  pleasure  (1992a,  Ch.  4).  It 
indicates  comfort  and  stimulation  as  equally 
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Key. The graph indicates that the satisfaction level 
is  highest  when  the  intensity  of  the  stimulus  is 
placed at intermediary level. 
 
FIGURE  3.  Scitovsky’s  conceptual   
distinction  between  comfort  and 
pleasure 
FIGURE  4.  Personal  re-elaboration  of 
Wundt’s  graph  according  to  Scitovsky’s 
interpretation of the arousal theory 12 
 
would  be  no  change  in  arousal  toward  the  optimum”  (id.  1992a,  p.  71).  He  therefore 
identifies a trade-off: 
 
«we must choose between pleasure at some sacrifice of comfort» (ibidem). 
 
Pleasure is obtainable only at the price of less comfort, and comfort at the price of less 
pleasure. Faced by such a reality, Scitovsky privileges the consumption of creative goods 
over  defensive  ones.17  First  of  all  because  the  satisfaction  felt  on  consuming  them  is  
independent and neither does it rely on a situation of previous discomfort, but on the 
realization of personal intrinsic motives: 
 
«pleasure arises instead from all those activities that generate positive satisfaction through 
the delectation of the senses, and the exercise and enrichment of ones faculties, from taste 
sensation to intellectual constructs» (ivi, p. 60; my italics). 
 
In the second place because differently from defensive goods, most creative goods also 
possess the same characteristics as defensive ones. A ready example is offered by fast food 
and ready-to-eat food, clearly defensive goods as opposed to the art of cooking, creative 
goods which satisfy a physiological need (food) but at the same time satisfy the need for 
creativity and relations felt by those who do the cooking or sit at the table (ivi, p. 183). 
According  to  Scitovsky,  inexpert  consumers  faced  by  this  trade-off  are  more  likely  to 
maximize comfort for two reasons: resources and time. 
Regarding  resources,  Scitovsky  notes  that  most  people  prefer  the  consumption  of 
defensive goods to creative ones  because of the greater initial investment, quantifiable in 
terms of the psychic and physical energy needed for the fruition and enjoyment of creative 
goods  (activation costs).  Just  think,  for  example,  of  the  physical  and intellectual  effort 
needed by training for a marathon, or a playing chess in a tournament. The consumption of 
defensive goods, instead does not present similar costs on entry,  in that it does not call for 
any particular skill for fruition or consumption. Watching TV for example is a relaxing 
physically  undemanding  activity  that  does  not  require  the  investment  of  substantial 
intellectual resources (ivi, Ch. 8). The excessive consumption of defensive goods produces 
collateral effects that emerge only long-term. Given their advantages in terms of costs, 
they can arrive at crowding out the consumption of creative goods. Once a life of ease has 
been reached, however, it is difficult to turn back. In the moment in which a consumer 
                                                        
17 For an elegant explanation of Scitovsky’s argument in favour of creative consumption, see Marina 
Bianchi (2003). 13 
 
notices the negative effects deriving from an excess of ease and comfort, consumption has 
already become a habit, which is difficult to lose,  given the  effects of addiction.18 
Such a neuro-psychological trap – as also pointed out by Amartya Sen (1996) – has far-
reaching  implications  not  only  for  the  idea  of  the  use  of  rationality  in  predicting  and 
explaining behavior, but also for the importance of freedom to change preferences and, 
most importantly, the freedom to change our mind. 
In  the  terms  of  individual  costs,  such  life  style  choices  lead  to  a  drastic  reduction  in 
creative activities and seriously affect the individual’s general satisfaction. Once individual 
consumption choices are inserted in the logic of group dynamics, with a drive coming  
from a continual process of imitation and distinction, these very choices carry equally 
heavy  costs  for  the  whole  of  society.19  If  in  fact  the  reference  group  (Scitovsky’s 
Establishment, p. 211), shows a clear preference for the production and consumption of 
defensive goods, individuals from other social classes will make the same choices in an 
attempt to stand apart from the mass and be accepted by the reference group. Scitovsky 
observes however that while the spill-over effect of the consumption of creative goods is 
such as to generate important positive external effects “stimulation is, typically, a non-
exclusive  or shared  source  of  satisfaction.  By  contrast,  comforts  and  want  satisfaction 
usually lack these spill-over effect” (ivi, p. 86), the crowd out effect of the consumption of 
defensive  goods  does  not  stop  at  damaging  personal  health  and  environment.  It  also 
damages social relationships.  
On the same argument, the TV is again a paradigmatic case in that it illustrates both the 
addictive potentialities of comfort and the crowding-out effect that addiction produces on 
creative goods. According to Scitovsky’s data (ivi, p. 164) the interviewees in a survey 
promoted by the US Department of Commerce, refer to watching television not out of 
interest but because they do not know how to “use their time differently”.20 
As far as time is concerned, Scitovsky holds that a consumer tends to choose comfort 
goods for a lack of time. Self-evaluation questionnaires and the data furnished by statistics 
on  American  consumer  choices  indicate  that  modern  society  is  falling  sick  with 
                                                        
18 To explain the addiction effect, Scitovsky turns to Hebb’s 1955 “adaptive modulation of a synaptic 
answer”.  For  Hebb  neural  connections  are  not  fixed,  but  time  variable  and  modifiable  through 
experience. He hypothesized that the connection between two neurons is strengthened whenever it 
is  used.  A  much  used  connection  will  therefore  be  stronger  than  a  little  used  one.  Excessive 
repeated connections reduce the receptive elasticity of the neural structure, leading to the loss of 
the mental elasticity need to create new cellular clusters. 
19 Scitovsky’s thought on the role of consumer goods in group dynamics is ideally very close to that 
of Thorstein Veblen (1899) and George Simmel (1900). Nowadays psychologists and sociologists 
explain these dynamics with the metaphor of the treadmill (Brickman and Campbell, 1971) and the 
phenomenon known as “keeping up with the Jones” or in its more modern version as “street cred”,  
children’s need to look good with branded clothing.  
20 More recently, Bruni and Stanca (2008) identified a direct relationship between an excess of 
television and a reduction of relational activities. 14 
 
chronophagy (lit. being devoured by time).21 He also commentates with a certain irony on 
the condition of modern man: 
 
«in our society of The Harried Leisure Class, whose high hourly earnings make their time so 
precious that they cannot afford the time it takes to enjoy life and are forced to eat their 
meals on the run, cut short the foreplay in lovemaking, attend abbreviated religious services, 
buy books to glance at, not to read, and have no time to look at the beauty spots of the world 
to which their conferences take them» (ivi, p. 163). 
 
This data too has been confirmed by the research carried out into psycho-sociological of 
time pressure (Rosa, 2003).  
Scitovsky summarizes in this way the causes of consumer dissatisfaction in the economy 
of abundance. When “comfort is the absence of both pain and pleasure” and “too much 
comfort may preclude pleasure”, he concludes that though consumers are replete, they are 
still unsatisfied because they “overindulge in comfort” (ivi, pp. 62-63). 
The justness of such an observation has been recently confirmed by a recent study on the 
relation between self-control, well-being and satisfaction. Just like Scitovsky, Alois Stutzer 
(2007)  also  attributes  the  causes  of  suboptimal  consumer  choices  to  insufficient  self-
control. Though the individual is aware of all the health hazards in eating certain products, 
he/she may still opt for the immediate gratification and goes ahead with consumption.  
Since  «most  rewarding  activities  require  a  skill  for  their  exercise  and  enjoyment» 
(Scitovsky  1995,  p.  236),  Scitovsky  opts  for  the  “generalist”  solution  and  advice  the 
consumer to possess broad culture in terms of knowledge and experience (consumption 
sklls). Given the unquestioned technological advantages of a society which is becoming 
more  and  more  specialized  and  sophisticated,  an  interesting  proposal  to  smooth  the 










                                                        
21 The sociologist Hartmut Rosa (2003) uses the term “Chronophagy” for the illness “devouring” 
modern  man’s  living  time:  «[…]  the  history  of  modernity  seem  to  be  characterized  by  a  wide-
ranging speed-up of all kinds of technical, economic, social and cultural process and by a picking up 
of all the general pace of life» (p. 3). 15 
 
Figure 5. Psychophysiological needs and consumer goods. 
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Scitovsky’s  theory  is  particularly  illuminating  for  economists  and  psychologist  dealing 
with consumption because, besides solving the paradox of consumer dissatisfaction in the 
economy  of  abundance,  it  raises  a  series  of  useful  arguments  for  verifying  traditional 
economic theory on choices. 
In  the  first  place,  the  problem  of  comfort  addiction  on  one  side  and  the  traps  of 
consumerism on the other, often inducing consumers to choose goods that give them no 
satisfaction. This puts into question a theory of choices based on the criterion of revealed 
preferences. 
Secondly,  the  psychological  theory  of  arousal  has  shown  that  the  model  of  homo 
œconomicus  sponsored  by  neoclassical  economists  is  a  poor  representation  of  human 
behavior.   
Lastly, if as the theory of arousal shows through recreational activities, people often do not 
act to feel pleasure, but pleasure because they act, it follows that pleasure is not the cause 
of action, but its effect. In other terms, satisfaction does not come so much from the result 
of a process as much as from the process itself. Hence it can be deduced that an economic 
theory like the neoclassical one based exclusively on a utilitarian viewpoint is partial and 
incomplete. 
 
5.  The Scitovsky contribution to behavioral economics 
In The structure of scientific revolutions (1962), Thomas S. Khun observes that when “a 
normal problem, one that ought to be solvable by known rules and procedures, resists the 
Key. The diagram illustrates the three kinds of need identified by Scitovsky (appetitive desires, 
social desires, the need for stimuli) and goods that the modern economy supplies for their needs 
(defensive and creative goods). As shown by the arrows, defensive goods only satisfy the need for 
comfort while creative goods also possess certain aspects of defensive goods, and manage to satisfy 
all three categories of needs at the same time. 
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reiterated onslaught of the ablest members of the group within whose competence it falls”, 
“an anomaly that cannot, despite repeated effort, be aligned with professional expectation” 
and  have  such  pervasive  influence  that  they  ultimately  serve  to  “subvert  the  existing 
tradition of scientific practice (p. 6). He also notes that normal science22 often suppresses 
basic  ground-breaking  innovations  because  they  subvert  its  basic  research  programs. 
Since  the  decision  to  abandon  an  obsolete  scientific  theory  requires  the  wide-scale 
destruction of existing paradigms and methodologies, the emergence of new theories is 
normally preceded by a period of profound uncertainty. The assimilation of new theories 
calls for the reconstruction of preceding theorization and a fresh evaluation of previously 
observed  facts  in  an  intrinsically  revolutionary  way  which  is  rarely  brought  to  a 
conclusion by an individual, and certainly never in a short space of time.   
Tibor Scitovsky’s contribution belongs to a period of transition for economics similar to 
the one described by Khun. While neoclassical economic theorization was shored up by 
pillars which were beginning to crumble with the experiments of Kahneman e Tversky 
(1979), a further erosion was being operated by the progress of other alternative theories. 
When it was first published in The Joyless Economy his theory of choice was panned by 
many critics, partly because of its psychological approach, partly because it attacked many 
of the basic principles of traditional economy. 
 
 
«The Joyless Economy was a revolutionary book, but that was the problem with it» (J. 
Friedman and A. McCabe, 1996, p. 471); 
 
«It  was  the  middle  of  1970s.  Growing  conservatism  in  social  thought  (following  the 
radical 1960s) was being accompanied by some hardening of methodological inertia in 
economics»  (A. Sen, 1996, p. 481). 
 
«When the first edition of  Tibor Scitovsky’s The Joyless Economy articulated this message 
in 1976, most economists simply were not ready for it» (R. Frank, Foreword to The Joyless 
Economy, revised edition, 1992, p. iii). 
 
According to the economist Shlomo Maital (1988), all the hostility to the first edition was 
because: 
 
«winning the race requires skill at both leaps and steps. In science, as in horse race, it is 
the leaps that arouse the crowd. In economics, attempted leaps are overly scarce. Tibor 
Scitovsky’s  book,  The  Joyless  Economy,  is  one  of  the  most  interesting,  significant,  and 
original of such attempts» (Maital, 1988, p. 1). 
 
                                                        
22 For “normal”  Khun  means science validated in a given historical context.      17 
 
 
For Scitovsky’s merits to be fully recognized, time had to pass, as Kuhn had foreseen.  
At  the  Round  Table  organized  to  celebrate  the  twentieth  anniversary  of  The  Joyless 
Economy, the contents of which published in a special number of Critical Review, one of the 
many merits recognized in Scitovsky was that of having re-opened the dialogue between 
economics  and  psychology,  so  brusquely  cut  off  by  Pareto  and  having  presented  new 
issues.  
Thirty-five  years  after  Scitovsky  made  his  observations,  economists  have  once  again 
become interested in the determinants of subjective well-being, the role personality traits, 
habit and adaptation play and other effects under which simple maximization rules are 
violated (Kahneman and Sugden, 2005; Kahneman and Thaler, 2006; Frey and Stutzer, 
2008). Scitovsky’s name is now listed among the outliers of behavioral economics (Angner 
and Loewenstein, 2007; Frey and Stutzer, 2008) and cited as forerunner of the happiness 
studies in economics (Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Bianchi, 2003, 2004; Pugno, 2004).  
 
 
6.  Conclusions  
This paper hopes to have illustrated how Scitovsky’s way of using psychology to explain 
the  dynamics  behind  choice  place  him  among  the  behavioral  economists  involved  in 
elaborating  more realistic theories  of choice than the rationally-based one. 
Scitovsky’s  work  plays  a  pivotal  role in  both  economic  theory  and methodology. With 
psychology, in fact, he not only shows that 1) the revealed preference principle is a myopic 
indicator  for  satisfaction  and  that  2)  satisfaction  does  not  coincide  with  the  utility 
maximization, either if given by the consumption of defensive goods or creative ones, but 
with the consumer’s capability to temper between the two. He also calls attention to the 
theoretical  validity  and  practical  usefulness  of  the  concrete  deductive  method,  a 
methodology which today is the core argument of experimental economics.    
By his part, Daniel Kahneman (et al., 2005; 2006) acknowledges Scitovsky’s great attempt 
to increase the explanatory and predictive power of economic theory by providing it with 
more  psychologically  plausible  foundations.  A further step of  this  research  shall  be  to 
ascertain if with his findings on motivational psychology Scitovsky has paved the way to 
the new field of studies hereafter launched by Kahneman and colleagues or, more likely, if 
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